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John Roberts's Formalist Nightmare
STEVEN L. WINTERt
One would think that the seventeenth Chief Justice would be seeth-
ing. It was, after all, Marx, who with an otherworldly prescience warned
that "[t]he tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare
on the brain of the living."' It is as if he had the Chief Justice's plurality
opinion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. F specifically in mind. Not only does Roberts's opinion
reenact a Nineteenth Century formalist jurisprudence, but it manifests a
more reactionary worldview than even Plessy v. Ferguson.3
It is conventional to evaluate judicial opinions according to a
schema that asks whether the judge is a formalist or a realist, a liberal or
a conservative, an activist or one who practices judicial restraint. This
schema for categorizing judicial opinions, like all categorization, pro-
duces prototype effects.' Typically, formalism and judicial restraint are
associated with conservative judges and realism and activism with lib-
eral ones. While there is no necessary congruence among these three
factors, there are affinities and valences. Formalists are typically con-
servative; it is hard to think of a socially conservative realist, though
Justice Harlan comes to mind. Formalism is often aligned with social
conservatism in a Burkean sense ("ours is not to reason why.. ."). More
importantly, formalism is conservative of a legal or legislative victory,
insisting on adherence to its distillation in a principle or rule. Hence, it is
perfectly possible for a judicial decision to be formalist but politically
liberal. Justice Black's First Amendment absolutism is a familiar exam-
ple. From time to time, Justice Brennan's opinions display this same
formalist quality.5
What do I mean by formalism? Perhaps the most conventional
usage of the term formalist is as an epithet to describe a judicial decision
t Walter S. Gibbs Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State University Law School;
J.D. Columbia, 1977; B.A. Yeshiva University, 1974. My thanks to Dick Posner for his criticisms
and suggestions.
1. KARL MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF Louis BONAPARTE 15 (C.P. Dutt ed.,
International Publishers Co., Inc. trans., 2d ed. 1963) (1869).
2. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. Prototype effects are a consequence of the non-criterial nature of most human
categorization. See STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE & MIND 70-92
(2001).
5. See, e.g., N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86-87 (1982)
(plurality opinion); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226-37 (1962).
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that ascribes away responsibility (as in, "it's not me, it's my job ... or
the law, or the text, etc."). Hence, formalism is the frequent refuge of
socially and politically conservative judges when faced with the claims
of reform movements. In his famous study of how nominally antislavery
judges like Story and Shaw responded to abolitionist claims, Robert
Cover documents the rather extreme lengths to which they went to assert
their helplessness before the law.' But this formalist rhetorical mode can
also be used to rationalize potentially unpopular liberal decisions (as in,
"it's not me, it's the Constitution"). In extending First Amendment pro-
tection to commercial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, for example, the Court rejected the
state's claim that advertising would lower professional standards and
induce consumers to favor low-cost, low-quality drugstore chains over
more professional local pharmacies.7 "It is precisely this kind of choice,
between the dangers of suppressing information, and the dangers of its
misuse if it is freely available, that the First Amendment makes for us."8
Formalism, in this sense, operates as a blanket appeal to authority.
A second, closely related meaning of formalism refers to the kind
of conceptualism associated with Langdell and decried by Pound as
"mechanical jurisprudence."9 The central idea is that general doctrines
can be applied deductively to decide specific cases, thereby assuring the
objectivity and neutrality of judicial decisionmaking. This approach is
formalist in the sense that the reasoning process is supposed to be guided
solely by the formal entailments of the concept (e.g., "freedom of con-
tract").'0 But it is also formalist in the first sense I have identified
because the essential claim of this approach is that the judge's decision
is the consequence solely of a logical operation independent of human
choice or will (as in, "it's not me, it's the rule ... ").
A third, equally conventional usage of formalism is to connote
hypertechnicality in judicial decisionmaking. Chief Justice Roberts's
second term provides not one, but two examples of the rigid application
6. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 240-41,
265-66 (1975). Shaw was, in fact, the particular object of Melville's critique in Billy Budd,
though his slavery opinions were only part of what Melville found so profoundly disturbing in his
father-in-law. See Steven L. Winter, Melville, Slavery, and the Failure of the Judicial Process, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 2471, 2473 (2005).
7. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-71
(1976).
8. Id. at 770.
9. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 607 (1908). It was just
this method of legal reasoning that Holmes assailed in his famous aphorism in his Lochner
dissent: "General propositions do not decide concrete cases." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45,
76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
10. In this sense, Langdellian doctrinalism is also formalist in the fourth sense identified
below. See infra text accompanying nn.26-32.
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of legal deadlines notwithstanding the presence of strong equitable
claims and long-recognized exceptions. In Bowles v. Russell, the federal
district judge had granted the habeas petitioner a seventeen-day exten-
sion in which to file his notice of appeal.' The petitioner filed within
the allotted time; the Court nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the
appeal on the ground that the relevant statute authorizes extensions of
only fourteen days. 2 In doing so, the Court not only ignored several
recent unanimous decisions repudiating this technical approach to proce-
dural deadlines,1 3 but also overruled earlier decisions which had specifi-
cally held that reliance on a district court's erroneous representation as
to the time for filing a notice of appeal constituted excusable neglect.' 4
In the second case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Com-
pany, the Court held that the plaintiff's sex discrimination claim was
time-barred. 5 Lilly Ledbetter, who had worked for Goodyear since
1979, claimed that she had received lower annual merit raises because of
discriminatory performance evaluations, that those earlier decisions con-
tinued to affect the amount of her pay throughout her career, and that by
the time of her retirement in 1998 she was earning substantially less than
similarly situated male supervisors. Under Title VII, a person who
wishes to sue must first file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days of
the unlawful employment practice. 6 The Court had previously held that
one-time decisions such as the denial of tenure or changes to the senior-
ity system, whose effects are felt only later when they result in termina-
tion, must be challenged within 180 days of the decision and not of the
termination. But it had also been held that accumulated pay disparities
are different because each paycheck perpetuates the earlier discrimina-
tion (and, in a case such as this one, each annual raise compounds the
11. Bowles v. Russell, 127 S. Ct. 2360, 2362 (2007).
12. Id. at 2363 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (2000); FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)). Not only was the
Court's position hypertechnical, its reasoning was formalist in the first sense in that it feigned lack
of choice by purporting to rely solely on neutral, deductive reasoning from general premises.
Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2365-66 ("Because Congress decides whether federal courts can hear cases
at all, it can also determine when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them....
The resolution of this case follows naturally from this reasoning.").
13. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 510 (2006); Eberhart v. United States, 546 U. S.
12, 17-18 (2005); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454 (2004).
14. Bowles, 127 S. Ct. at 2366. The earlier cases are Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat
Packers, Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217 (1962), and Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 387 (1964). See also
Gibbs v. Town of Frisco City, 626 F.2d 1218, 1221 (5th Cir. 1980) (ruling that, as a matter of law,
appellant had a right to rely on the service standards published by the United States Postal Service
and that the district court erred when it failed to find excusable neglect when the notice of appeal
arrived one day late, but two days after the time specified by Postal standards).
15. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2167-68, 2174 (2007).
The holding of Ledbetter has since been reversed by Congress. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
16. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (2000).
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earlier disparities). 17 In an opinion by Justice Alito, the Court ruled that
Ledbetter could not seek relief at all because the discriminatory raises
had not occurred within 180 days of her filing. Her case of sex discrimi-
nation, it reasoned, was based on "not a single wrong consisting of a
succession of acts," but rather on "a series of discrete discriminatory
acts," none of which fell within the statutory deadline. 8
As in Ledbetter, hypertechnicality and conceptualism often work
hand-in-hand to provide a cover of necessity for willfully reactionary
decisions. One of the more egregious historical examples is Justice
Holmes's opinion in Giles v. Harris.'9 There, African-American citizens
challenged Alabama's constitutional scheme governing qualifications
for voting. Amongst other claims, they alleged that the "good character"
qualification for voting was administered by state officials to "let in all
whites and [keep] out a large part, if not all, of the blacks."2 Writing for
the Court, Justice Holmes accepted the plaintiffs' allegations as true
(which they undoubtedly were) but denied their request for an injunction
to require local election officials to register them to vote. He reasoned
that, because plaintiffs alleged that the state constitutional scheme gov-
erning voter registration was "a fraud upon the Constitution" and had
asked the Court "to declare it void," it was not possible for the Court to
order that they be registered "under the void instrument."'" Any other
conclusion, Holmes argued, would make the Court "a party to the
unlawful scheme by accepting it and adding another voter to its fraudu-
lent lists. '22 Indeed, he went so far as to argue that even if the injunction
were to assure that all qualified African-American citizens were regis-
tered, it would not cure the invalidity of a scheme "illegal in [its]
inception. 23
What unites Holmes's reasoning in Giles with Justice Alito's in
Ledbetter is a willful refusal to look beyond a categorization that is itself
17. See Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (discussing Title VII, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e et seq. (2000)); Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 207(e), 255(a) (2000);
BAR1ARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 477 (2d
ed. 1983).
18. Ledbetter, 127 S. Ct. at 2175.
19. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
20. Id. at 483.
21. Id. at 486.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 487. Holmes further explained:
It is not an answer to say that if all the blacks who are qualified according to the
letter of the instrument were registered, the fraud would be cured .... If the sections
of the Constitution concerning registration were illegal in their inception, it would
be a new doctrine in constitutional law that the original invalidity could be cured by
an administration which defeated their intent.
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merely optional. One can characterize the racially discriminatory
scheme at issue in Giles as a "fraud on the Constitution" and, thus,
"void." Or one can characterize it as a discriminatory administration of
the law in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.24 But to pretend it is
the former and then deduce judicial incapacity from that particular char-
acterization is to play fast and loose with the law.25 So, too, whether pay
inequity is viewed as "a single wrong consisting of a succession of acts"
or "a series of discrete discriminatory acts" is not a fact about the world,
but a description of it. One can characterize pay discrimination as an
ongoing practice or disaggregate it into its constituent actions. Either
characterization is plausible; neither constitutes an argument. To make
an argument, one would have to give a reason why one characterization
is more appropriate. Thus, as Justice Ginsburg points out in dissent,
adverse employment decisions such as promotions, transfers, firings, or
changes to the seniority system are public events known to all affected
by them. Consequently, it makes some sense to treat them as discrete
discriminatory acts subject to the 180-day filing requirement. Pay dis-
crimination, on the other hand, is typically hidden both because salaries
are often confidential and because the disparities between employees'
raises in any given year are typically small but increase incrementally-
and, thus, become more obvious-over time.26
A fourth sense of formalism is as a mode of reasoning that treats
concepts as meaningful entirely abstracted from their contexts. 27 This is
the formalism of Lochner and its progeny, in which freedom of contract
implies that everyone is free "to make contracts regarding labor upon
such terms as they may think best"28 without regard to real-world differ-
ences in bargaining power. This, too, is the sense of formalism at work
in the notion of formal equality. In Plessy, for example, the Court under-
stood the Fourteenth Amendment as commanding only formal equal-
ity-that is, "the absolute equality of the two races before the
law.... "29 On this acontextual view, the legal meaning of the segrega-
24. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
25. Holmes's opinion in Giles is particularly reprehensible given that he had already staked
out his jurisprudential position as an antiformalist. See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in
Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443, 460 (1899) ("We must think things not words,
or at least we must constantly translate our words into the facts for which they stand, if we are to
keep to the real and the true.").
26. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2181-83 (2007)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27. In this sense, formalism partakes of the Platonic doctrine of the Forms. Similarly, a formal
system is one in which the various parts relate to one another rather than to reality. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 9-11, 53-61 (1990).
28. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905).
29. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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tion acts was solely a matter of its formal properties which applied to
both races equally. The social meaning of segregation, in contrast, was
purely a matter of subjective interpretation: If "the enforced separation
of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority ... it
is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the
colored race chooses to put that construction upon it."' 3° Conversely, it is
an appeal to context that is the basis of Justice Stevens' objection both in
Seattle and in Adarand Constructors v. Pena31 where, respectively, he
invokes Anatole France's famous quip that the law in all its majesty
forbids the "'rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the
streets, and to steal their bread'- 32 and complains that the Court's appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to affirmative action disregards "the difference
between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome mat."3 3
Though it is perhaps less obvious, this notion of formalism is pro-
foundly linked to individualism. 34 Thus, in Lochner, it is the formal indi-
vidual-that is, the one endowed with the same legal rights as every
other-who is free to contract as he or she sees fit regardless of the
economic realities. So, too, in Plessy, the meaning of segregation is not a
social or cultural fact, but a matter of interpretation which individuals
are free to determine for themselves. Indeed, it is only in this formalized
world of individuals abstracted from their social contexts that it is possi-
ble simultaneously to acknowledge that "the sorry history of both private
and public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of
opportunities for black entrepreneurs"35 and yet insist that the resulting
differences in white and black participation in the relevant market is
nevertheless a matter of "entrepreneurial choices. 3 6
What unifies these different meanings is the metaphor of form and
substance. The basic idea in each case is that the conceptual operation
involves the external form of the relevant performance without attention
to the substantive dimensions that give it meaning. Thus, the idea of
formalism as ascription away of responsibility involves decisionmakers
who give every appearance of deciding the case according to law with-
30. Id. at 551.
31. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 242-65 (1995) (Stevens, J.
dissenting).
32. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2798 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
33. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 245 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Cf. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1685, 1737-51, 1776-78 (1976) (identifying rules with individualism and standards with
altruism).
35. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
36. Id. at 503 ("There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation,
including ... both black and white career and entrepreneurial choices.").
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out ever acknowledging that the law they are "following" is in actuality
a product of their own interpretive acts.37 With conceptualism and
hypertechnicality, as with rule-formalism, the operation is to subsume
the specifics (say, a fact pattern) under a general concept (or rule) if it
fits the category or stated criteria (i.e., its "form") regardless of whether
its purpose or spirit (the concept's or rule's "substance") is implicated.38
Finally, the idea of formalism as abstraction from context entails a focus
on abstract entities (rights-bearing individuals equal before the law) and
their relations (e.g., freedom of contract) to the exclusion of the contex-
tual social factors (e.g., education, social recognition, mutual respect,
economic position) that gives those entities and relations substance and
shape.
Seattle, like its predecessors at least since Adarand, is formalist in
all of the ways previously examined: (1) insisting on adherence to prece-
dent narrowly construed (i.e., an appeal to authority); (2) making no
distinction between invidious and potentially benign racial classifica-
tions (i.e., treating "discrimination" acontextually according to the logic
of a general concept); and (3) insisting on equal protection as a radically
individualist right regardless of the social groups to which we belong
and the impact and social consequences that flow from that sociological
reality.
So far, all of this is familiar enough criticism of the Court's recent
affirmative action jurisprudence. What is striking about Seattle, how-
ever, is the way in which Roberts's formalism deforms his critical
capacities.
In making his controversial remarks on Brown,3 9 the Chief Justice
insists that "history will be heard. '40 But he is peculiarly tone-deaf to
history. Brown, he says, held that "government classification and separa-
tion on grounds of race themselves denoted inferiority. '41 The problem
is that, under the voluntary plans adopted by the Seattle and Louisville
school boards, students were classified by race but not separated. Quite
the contrary. Classification by race was undertaken solely for the pur-
pose of ameliorating racial isolation. Roberts cites Brown II as requiring
37. POSNER, supra note 26, at 95-98 ("The point.., is that in a system of precedent it is the
later court that has the whip hand... ").
38. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 467, 499 (1988) ("Roscoe
Pound called formalism 'mechanical jurisprudence' because the classical lawyers had a tendency
to apply their general principles relentlessly-regardless of the underlying policies or the
consequences of these policies in specific cases.") (reviewing LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM
AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)).
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Adam Liptak, The Same Words, but
Differing Views, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29, 2007, at A24.
40. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2767 (2007).
41. Id.
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school assignments "on a nonracial basis. '42 But the relevant precedent
is not Brown II but Green.43 Roberts seems to have forgotten that long
and bitter experience forced the Court to repudiate that statement when
it later struck down freedom of choice plans.44
The reason the Chief Justice misses both this history and his own
inner contradiction is that he is not applying Brown at all. What guides
his reasoning is not Brown, but Harlan's dissenting opinion in Plessy.
For him, equal protection jurisprudence is summed up by principles of
individualism and colorblindness. He is tripped up by the presupposi-
tions of his own construction, never noticing that his own statement dis-
tinguishes Seattle from Brown. Thus, when he says that, in Brown, "[i]t
was not the inequality of the facilities but the fact of legally separating
children on the basis of race on which the Court relied to find a constitu-
tional violation in 1954,' '4 he fails to notice that in Seattle and Louis-
ville no one was being separated (legally or otherwise) and, therefore,
that no inferiority was implied. So, too, he seems to miss that Harlan's
declaration that the Constitution is colorblind was qualified by what
immediately follows: that it "neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens."46 This, of course, is all the difference between the Seattle case
and the cases upon which the Chief Justice so disingenuously relies. The
racial classification in Seattle, unlike the segregation at issue in Plessy
and Brown, created no second-class citizens.
Roberts chides Justice Breyer for relying on "admitted dicta[ ] and
other noncontrolling pronouncements. . . -4' But when he engages
Brown, he relies not on anything in Chief Justice Warren's opinion for
the Court, but rather on statements by Thurgood Marshall in the briefs
and oral arguments. It is there, and not in the Court's opinion, that Rob-
erts finds the longed-for claim that race cannot be a factor in school
admissions.48 He is entirely deaf to what Brown says, which is that sepa-
ration based on race "generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
42. Id. (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) ("Brown IF'))
(emphasis in original).
43. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
44. Id. at 439 ("The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now.") (emphasis in original).
45. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2767 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 494).
46. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, in the
immediately preceding sentences, Harlan makes the same point: "in view of the [C]onstitution, in
the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is
no caste here." Id.
47. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2764.
48. Id. at 2782-83.
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unlikely ever to be undone."4 9 Warren was anything but formalist. Just
as Warren insisted in Loving v. Virginia that miscegenation laws are
"measures designed to maintain White Supremacy, ' 50 his opinion in
Brown had nothing to do with any supposed principle of colorblindness.
It was, rather, a frank acknowledgment of the meaning of Jim Crow.
In Philip Roth's words, "exclusion is a primary form of humilia-
tion, and humiliation is crippling-it does terrible injury to people, it
twists them, it deforms them, as every American minority can attest and
as the best American minority writers make clear .... ," Nothing like
this was going on in the Seattle and Louisville school districts, and only
Roberts's own blindness could manage to equate the two.
Roberts's version of Brown is, in fact, unrecognizable. If Brown
was about anything, it was about history and context. Warren empha-
sized the place that public education had come to occupy in twentieth
century American life-that is, as the institution for awakening cultural
values and introducing children to the "foundation of good citizen-
ship."52 Brown was all about social context and meaning.53 It was about
the role of acculturation of citizens to live in a multiracial society. Rob-
erts, on the other hand, turned Brown into Plessy by making it a case
about absolute equality before the law,54 entirely abstracted from the
obvious social meaning of contemporary race relations.
In one way, Roberts's opinion in Seattle is worse than that in
Plessy. At least Plessy acknowledged that legislative decisionmaking
can take local customs and traditions into account.55 Plessy, in other
words, at least manifested deference to the democratic political process.
The striking thing in Seattle is that, for all that it fetishizes the parapher-
nalia of precedent (distinguishing dicta from holdings, etc.), one sus-
pects it is really the rejection of radical libertarian individualism that
49. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
50. Loving v. Virginia, 388 US 1, 11 (1967).
51. Philip Roth, The Story Behind "The Plot Against America," N.Y. TiMEs, Sept. 19, 2004,
at CIO.
52. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to
1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.
We must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation."). Id. at 492-93.
53. Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 1441, 1527-34 (1990).
54. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2758 n.14
(2007) (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In respect of
civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.")). Compare Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544.
55. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550 ("In determining the question of reasonableness, [the legislature]
is at liberty to act with reference to the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people,
and with a view to the promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace and
good order.").
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most bugs the Chief Justice. Thus, in footnote fourteen, he decries the
Seattle school board's rejection of individualism as a form of cultural
racism.5 6 It is just a little bit too "PC" for him. The Seattle school board
specifically had refused to hold onto unsuccessful concepts such as a
colorblind mentality. And Roberts unwittingly confirms the anachronis-
tic quality of such conceptions by citing in its defense not the Court's
recent jurisprudence, but rather Harlan's dissent in Plessy.57
In the battle of the footnotes, it is Footnote Four that Roberts
should be attending to.58 For what the Chief Justice is rejecting is the
political process. The voters of Seattle and Louisville are entitled to a
different view than the Court's, at least where (unlike Plessy or Brown)
it is not a politically powerless or excluded group that is being burdened.
This points out both the empty formalism and the undemocratic nature
of the Court's application of a unitary, strict scrutiny standard to any and
every racial classification. Justice Breyer is correct: It is a democratic
prerogative to take a different view about how best to achieve a multira-
cial society,59 just as it was an educational prerogative-to which the
Court in Grutter deferred-to seek diversity in higher education.60 And
Breyer, too, is correct that the Seattle plan is narrowly tailored. 61 There
may be many colorblind ways to avoid racial isolation-after all, Seattle
could have used a lottery to randomly assign students across the district
or massive busing to operationalize a colorblind assignment system. But
one can see why parents would have preferred the system chosen by
Seattle that emphasized neighborhood and proximity within broad racial
parameters, using race as a tiebreaker in a mere handful of assignment
decisions.
Though it is true that there is no necessary connection between
legal formalism and political conservatism, Chief Justice Roberts's opin-
ion in Seattle demonstrates the powerful conceptual and rhetorical affin-
ities between them. Formalist legal reasoning engages the decisionmaker
in a performance of impersonal decision by appealing to authority. It
disclaims the personal responsibility of the decisionmaker and, thus,
frustrates accountability. 62 And it operates in abstraction from the social
56. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2758 n.14.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
59. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2824 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("I believe only that the Constitution
allows democratically elected school boards to make up their own minds as to how best to include
people of all races in one America.").
60. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003).
61. Seattle, 127 S. Ct. at 2824-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
62. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 78-81 (2008) ("Neither [Roberts] nor any
other knowledgeable person actually believed or believes that the rules that judges in our system
apply.., are given to them the way that the rules of baseball are given to umpires.... The tension
[Vol. 63:549
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prerequisites and consequences of law. In all these ways, formalism is
anything but democratic. And, as the Chief Justice's Seattle opinion so
amply demonstrates, it is a distorting methodology that weighs on the
law like a nightmare more reminiscent of the injustices of the Nineteenth
Century than of a modem society that professes to value equal justice
under law.
between what he said at his confirmation hearing and what he is doing as a Justice is a blow to
Roberts's reputation for candor and a further debasement... of the testimony of nominees ... ").
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